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How are we to responsively belong to tradition? This paper retrieves the concept of self-tradition 
(Sichüberlieferung) in Heidegger’s magnum opus Being and Time (1927). We will take as a guiding 
light Heidegger’s designation of a mode of his phenomenology as “phenomenology of the inapparent” 
expressed in the 1973 Zähringen Seminar. We will pay special heed to the function of the middle voice, 
neutrality of Da-sein, and tautology in the question of Being and history and bring to light the relation 
between authentic temporality and authentic historicity in a tautological turning of the selfsame. We 
will make a remark on the delay of Da-sein’s authentic historicity in the light of the “self-tradition” 
which marks Heidegger’s non-metaphysical response to the heritage of metaphysics of presence. In 
the wake of the phenomenology of the inapparent, we will turn to Derrida’s 2008 text The Animal that 
Therefore I Am to explore Derrida’s different approach to free the “I am” from that of Heidegger’s Da-
sein whose being is set in Jeweilig-Jemeinigkeit. We will show how Derrida’s invention of animot enables 
him and us to speak with the voices of our non-human animal others and enables us to free ourselves 
from the fixities of presence of the present in our thought, language, and sensitivity. In a relay of the two 
philosophers’ reading of us and their ways of self-overcoming of man as rational animal, we will learn 
to be in question and to learn to relate to one another without reducing one to the other and other to 
the one.
Keywords: repetition, ek-sistence, ecstatic temporality, authentic historicity, self-tradition, the middle 
voice, tautology, animot.
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Каким образом мы должны ответственно принадлежать традиции? Эта статья восстанавли-
вает концепцию собственной традиции (Sichüberlieferung) в великом произведении Хайдеггера 
«Бытие и время» (1927). Мы принимаем за путеводную звезду обозначение Хайдеггером модуса 
своей феноменологии как “феноменологии неявленного”, выраженное в Царингенском семи-
наре 1973 года. Мы уделяем особое внимание функции среднего залога, нейтральности Da-sein 
и тавтологии в вопросе Бытия и истории и проливаем свет на отношение между подлинной 
темпоральностью и подлинной историчностью в тавтологическом повороте тождественного. 
Мы делаем замечание об остановке аутентичной историчности Da-sein в свете «собственной 
традиции», которая намечает неметафизический ответ Хайдеггера на наследие метафизики су-
ществования. Вслед за феноменологией неявного мы обращаемся к написанному в 2008 г. тек-
сту Деррида The Animal that Therefore I Am, чтобы исследовать подход Деррида к освобождению 
«Я есмь» от Da-sein Хайдеггера, чье бытие установлено в Jeweilig-Jemeinigkeit. Мы показываем, 
как изобретенное Деррида выражение animot позволяет ему и нам говорить голосами других 
живых существ, не являющихся людьми, и позволяет нам освободиться от фиксированности 
присутствия настоящего в нашей мысли, языке и чувствительности. В ретрансляции чтения 
двух философов о нас и их способах самопреодоления человека как разумного живого суще-
ства мы учимся ставить себя под вопрос и относиться друг к другу, не сводя одного к другому, 
а другого к одному.
Ключевые слова: повторение, эк-зистенция, экстатическая темпоральность, аутентичная исто-
ричность, средний залог, тавтология, animot.
Heidegger’s 1927 magnum opus Being and Time (Heidegger, 1927) invites us to 
an experience (die Erfahrung) of reading a non-historiographical text. By shifting the 
primary domain of thinking from Bewußt-sein to Da-sein1 (Heidegger, 1996, 6), Heide-
gger carries us as reader to an outside of representational thought and language and the 
time-honored belief in homo zōon logon echon (Heidegger, 1996, 22). In and through 
ec-static passages of Da-sein’s mortal temporality and historicity, the text moves us to 
“go all the way into” (erfahren) the root occurrence (geschehen) of life (Maly, 1993, 224). 
We readers undergo gauntlets of confronting the inherited sense of human ways 
to be in tracing Heidegger’s passage to the forgotten question of Being, which is the 
Sache sought again (re-peto) in Being and Time. On the threshold of our discovery of 
1 Da-sein literally means there-being or to be there.
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the relation between authentic temporality and authentic historicity in the text, let us 
hear from Heidegger how he understands his way of phenomenology.
In the 1973 Zähringen seminar, Heidegger named his mode of phenomenology 
“a phenomenology of the inapparent” with a draw of “tautological thinking” (Heideg-
ger, 2003, 80). What sort of phenomenology is “a phenomenology of the inapparent”? 
Τὸ-αủτὸ-λόγος. What sort of thinking is tautological thinking? How does a tautolog-
ical design of repetition between thinking and saying relate to a phenomenon, a phe-
nomenologist’s method, and the -logy of phenomenology? These questionable ques-
tions strike our mind because tautological thinking appears counter-intuitive and odd 
to us moderns. For in our everyday context, the Greek word αủτος of the tautology is 
ubiquitous; a few citations of the usage such as autonomy, automatic, and automobile 
betray sufficiently a common understanding of αủτος as self, the same, or by virtue of 
itself with a proviso the same means identical. Thus, we most likely intuit tautology 
as “a mere parroting (Wiedersagen)” without a spirit of critical thinking and we tend 
to cast it aside as an idle production of redundant saying (Courtine, 1993, 245). Our 
common take of tautology presupposes line-ups of a primacy of identity, an availabil-
ity of world-time with bearings of homogeneity, constancy, and linearity, and a yard-
stick of before/after in order to locate occurrences in the earlier and later as well as the 
interval in reference to the coming of beings before ourselves as agency. 
In contradistinction to the common view of the same, Heidegger understands 
tautology as “belonging together” and underscores that it can happen only between 
things that exist in their irreducible difference (Heidegger, 1984, 88). In the wake of 
thing’s “core movement (αủτου)” of ek-sistence and of ec-stacy which is disclosed in 
consonance (Zusammenstimmung) with a way “just as they are(αὔτως) the same as 
belonging together, remarks Heidegger, yields no viewpoint from which to further 
speculate on or to dialecticize for a whole of the originary given (Heidegger, 1984, 88). 
In the selfsame, a thinker becomes homeless, as it were. The self who enunciates and 
translates what was already said fall catastrophically from his specific living context 
at a time of repetition and yet at the same time comes to arise together with a coming 
of what was already said. What is said comes to and upon the thinker from the future, 
from the possible, which delivers a double possibility of projection to the thinker and 
to what was already said. As we will see shortly in Heidegger’s conceptions of primor-
dial temporality and self-tradition (Sichüberlieferung) in his magnum opus, the future 
seems to take a primacy in the tautological thinking and saying. Ταυτολογέω in the 
sense of the repetition of the same seems to operate on a letting-go of the autos as a 
bestower of meaning on the part of both the thinker and the given in terms of a claim 
for authority; a mutual self-disclaiming of agency therewith an infinite postponement 
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of self-ground and identity seems to make a room for each other’s re-birthing (re-nais-
sance) to be there in the world with ownmost potencies. It seems that the reciprocal 
delay of the self as agency brings about a non-mediational gathering between think-
ing, speaking, and what is already said. The selfsame hands itself down to itself at 
such a moment of repetition; in effect, the thinker’s rewording stems directly from the 
Sache selbst “as originally apprehended” (Courtine, 1993, 246). Heidegger’s view of 
tautology differs from a common view and practice of translation as rewording which 
is based on the system of signification. Seen from these preliminary exposures, we can 
glimpse that the phenomenology of Being and Time tracks down to the non-apparent 
origin (genesis) of thing’s presencing (Anwesen) and tends to de-present the voice as 
such regarding the inherited views of being and time. With attentiveness (Aufmerken) 
to the vital importance of the delay of the autos in Heidegger’s phenomenology, let us 
now return to Being and Time. 
In the section 7, Heidegger determines the concept of phenomenon and of phe-
nomenology on the basis of the Greek phainesthai (lit. to show itself) which is the middle 
voice of phaino (Heidegger, 1985, 81). The middle voice which Heidegger recalls from 
its lost usage in Western culture speaks of a self-enactment of thing (Scott, 1987, 68). 
Since the middle voice bears out an occurrence which is neither initiated nor received by 
anyone, it marks a pre-sense of both literal and figurative language and, as we will show, 
that Da-sein’s neutrality is bound to the character of the middle voice. Since the middle 
voice is counter-intuitive to us moderns, let me cite another Greek middle voiced word 
λανθάνομαι or ἐπιλανθάνομαι which means “to forget” and which relates, by the ver-
bal stem λαθ-, to ἀλήθεια, unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) (Heidegger, 1992b, 25–28; 
1984, 108–109.) For us to understand a middle voiced happening of forgetting, we must 
envision it beyond man’s reflexive, cognitive activity of failing to retain something which 
was present at some point in the past. We must heed an experience of forgetting as a 
non-subjective and non-objective “sending” (Schicken) of arising-not arising borne in a 
unifying emergence (Anwesen) of the twofold, that is, forgetting-and-forgotten (Scott, 
1996, 210). Or we may just say: forgetting forgets. In Being and Time, Heidegger in-
scribes a series of middle voiced words such as “time times,” “call calls,” “anxiety is anx-
ious,” and “world worlds” to highlight a non-subjective-and-non-objective disclosure 
of life at its root occurrence and to find a way for us to belong to the past in the light of 
presencing thus from a wholly other origin than presence.
Rendering in the middle voice, Heidegger defines his way of phenomenology as 
apophainesthai ta phainomena: “to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it 
shows itself from itself ” (Heidegger, 1996, 30). We notice that his way of showing in-
volves a form of a double letting be and a tautological turning of the selfsame-self-dis-
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closure of thing’s coming to appear-in-disappearing. The question of Being, which is 
to be sought through a different legein of the middle voice and its work of showing, is 
already at the outset of investigation thrown into a perpetual polemos between ques-
tioning and Being since neither side can occupy a place of either a cause or an effect; 
being anchorless, the question of Being is being in question and moves to find a path-
way solely by the grace of a double letting be and by virtue of the phenomenologist’s 
heedful correspondence to the self-disclosure of thing. 
In a way, the middle voice plays a pharmakon-like role in Being and Time. The 
middle voice escapes from the fixities of human as the rational animal, “the subject 
of events” and history, the antagonistic stance of subject-object binarism, truth as ad-
equation and accuracy, privilege of judgement, constitution, and evidence, ideality; 
it opens a region of the possible to Heidegger to think and speak of the finitude of 
human and time without substantive basis. By the same token, the middle voice keeps 
the origin of finite self-disclosive lives out of reach from anyone’s control; givenness 
of things remains first of all and for the most part inapparant for sight. This forecasts 
not only an impossibility of founding the ontological truth but also calls him into a re-
lentless repetition of a combat with the tradition which has been accustomed to think 
finitude (living-dying) in relation to some figure of transcendence. The middle voiced 
work of showing requires him to wrench the Being-self-showing occurrence-of be-
ings from what is said generally about beings in their Being so as to save a possibility 
not only for humans to be truly but also for our common heritage and memory from 
the smears of dissimulation, deformation, and indifference. 
Heidegger names this spiritual combat “destructuring” (Destruktion) (Heide-
gger, 1996, 20). In his 1956  essay Was Ist Das-Die Philosophie?, Heidegger speaks 
of destructuring more positively. Destructuring (Abbauen) aims at appropriation 
(Aneignung), not at demolishing of tradition (Heidegger, 1956, 22). In Being and Time, 
Heidegger states:
The elaboration of the question of being must […] become historical in a disciplined way 
in order to come to the positive appropriation of the past, to come into full possession 
of the most proper possibilities of inquiry. The question of the meaning of being is led to 
understand itself as historical […] as the provisional explication of Da-sein in its tempo-
rality and historicity. (Heidegger, 1996, 18)
Destructuring strives to make things light (lichten) by removing the burdens 
of overdue misconceptions about the way to be, that is, Zu-sein. With attentive care 
(Rücksicht) for an apriori past (“always already”) of the “transcendence pure and sim-
ple” presence of life-death, destructuring strives to clear (lichten) all the way through 
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a passage of transmission of the meaning of finitude so as to let things belong rightly 
to the past and to the future by re-moving history in alignment with a non-historical 
dimension of life. 
By virtue of self-transcendence (ek-sistence), the figure of Da-sein incorporates 
both stems of historicity and history. When we referred above to the 1973 Zähringen 
seminar, we mentioned Heidegger’s decisive shift in Being and Time of a foothold of 
inquiry from consciousness to Da-sein, and made a remark that the customary desig-
nations of man as the homo animal rationale, the ego, the subject, the individual, das 
Mann, and der Mensch no longer bespeak fittingly the being of Da-sein. Let us hear 
Heidegger’s designation of Da-sein:
The existential spatiality of Da-sein which determines its “place” for it in this way is itself 
based upon being-in-the-world. The over there is the determinateness of something en-
countered within the world. “Here” and “over there” are possible only in a “there,” that is, 
when there is a being which has disclosed spatiality as the being of the “there.” This being 
bears in its ownmost being the character of not being closed. The expression “there” 
means this essential disclosedness. Through disclosedness this being (Da-sein) is “there” 
for itself together with the Da-sein of the world […]. It is cleared in itself as being-in-the-
world, not by another being, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing […]. Da-sein is 
its disclosure. (Heidegger, 1996, 125)
Due to the essential character (Geschlecht)2, Da-sein differs fundamentally from 
living beings including a stock (Geschlecht) of human species, Vorhandenheit, and 
Zuhandenheit because these beings lack, unlike Da-sein, the roots of historicity in 
their history (Histoire) and in the accounts (Histoire) of their histories. By implication, 
Da-sein transports us back to a universal source of myriad lives of things gathered 
merely from the standpoint of man in the line of their historical generations and de-
clines (genesis-puthora). Perhaps, Da-sein is a figure of the first bearer, in Heidegger’s 
corpus, who plays a Hermes-like role to announce the forgotten question of being 
(and the forgotten word Geschlecht) in the history of humanity and to guide our way 
of recollection towards the enigmatic genesis with which to re-member a just form of 
co-belonging with the other. At this juncture, it is interesting to recall that the Greek 
verb gignomai, which means “to become,” bears the enigmatic change occurring si-
lently and inapparently in a transition from non-being to being and also indexes the 
enigma of genesis since the gignomai shares with the word genesis the same root (Das-
tur, 1994, 33). Also, the middle voiced ginesthai, as in φθορά γίνεται3, speaks of a 
2 For polysemic meanings that this word carries, see (Derrida, 2008, 7).
3 In The Anaximander Fragment, Heidegger elaborates on genesispthoran as the enigma of presen-
cing which carries forth one with the other without reducing one to the other and the other to one 
(Heidegger, 1984, 30).
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simultaneous counter-movement of coming-to-be-passing away of the self-showing 
life. Thus, when the word is addressed in the middle voice, the accent of the enigma 
regarding the enigma of origin shifts to the aporetic simultaneity of the opposites 
(Scott, 1996, 210). In any case, it has become clear to us that Da-sein is neither a 
worldless ego nor a tissue of transcendental ideality. Heidegger underscores that Da-
sein is the being of which we ourselves are (Heidegger, 1996, 39). Then, who are we 
really? How do we relate to Da-sein? 
Da-sein’s transcendence takes place as loss. Heidegger states:
Da-sein means: being held out into nothing. Holding itself out into the nothing, Da-
sein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. This being beyond beings we call 
“trans-cendence.” If in the ground of its essence Da-sein were not transcending, which 
now means, if it were not in advance holding itself out into the nothing, then it could 
never be related to beings nor even to itself. (Heidegger, 1993, 103)
Da-sein finds itself being always already thrown into a specific historical con-
text. Da-sein also finds itself always already dwelling in entanglement with (bei) peo-
ple and things nearby, and loses its mind and heart in taking care of many concerns 
(Heidegger, 1996, 351). Its primordial implacement in the world shows a phenome-
non of co-appearance between Da-sein, others, and “being-in-the-world.” Even if the 
ec-static stroke of Dasein’s origination remains both ineradicable and indeterminable 
to itself, Da-sein is already historical at the expense of its primordial thrownness. The 
equiprimordial co-appearance between Da-sein’s ek-sistence, Mitsein, and being-in-
the-world indicates that Da-sein is, unlike a figure of ipseity, strewn (Streuung) by 
the intrinsic possibility with multiple others it bears; it is not a simple unit of sin-
gularity. Da-sein never relates to one object (Derrida, 2008b, 19). Its ownmost past 
of the being-thrown (geworfen) does not take place in a horizon of the present-time 
line. By the same token, thanks to Da-sein’s self-transcendence, the world is removed 
from a familiar view of a subsisting container-like substance, and time too becomes 
unfixed from that of an infinite succession of nows in which things take their roots 
of de-generation. The boundary of horizon too gets expanded from an enclosure in 
man’s interiority to a historical place of dwelling opened by Da-sein’s transcendence. 
The abiding mode of “in-being” also is cast out of the stolid and objective presence to 
the affective involvement with the given with habitual familiarity (Heidegger, 1985, 
158). In the History of the Concept of Time (1925), Heidegger elucidates the sense of 
horizon and of the specificity of the Jeweiligkeit (Jemeinigkeit replaces it in Being and 
Time) by recalling etymological linkages between “bin” and “bei” and between “in-
nan” and “ann” (Heidegger, 1985, 158). 
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In a way, Da-sein’s self-transcendence defines Da-sein “to be it itself ” (Zu-
sein), nothing besides. In coming to light, Da-sein stands out (t) here unadorned and 
threadbare and presents its being-here as being-possible. To be it itself, Da-sein be-
comes modified and textured wherever and whosoever assumes it and gives it a voice 
by addressing to it and from it “I am.” We notice that several traces of the selfsame, 
doubling, and delay in the specific instantiation of Da-sein into “I,” or “You,” or any 
“one.” We shall call it translation (Übersetzung) and tradition (Überlieferung). Since 
the transcendence of Da-sein occurs non-mediatedly, anyone who assumes it at any 
given time and in place embodies in an intimate immediacy the essential character 
(Geschlecht) of the Zu-sein. In each translation and transference of Da-sein, self-re-
lation is purely bound to a non-mediational handing down of the “being-thrown” 
(Geworfenheit) between a non-identifiable giver and a non-identifiable receiver. The 
“and” of a giving-and-taking of nothing other than the being-possible is like an event 
(Ereignis), like a sending of a gift of life which appears to be taking place impersonally 
in any Da-sein’s self-relation. “This originary givenness is a sending” (Dastur, 1990. 
114) and a handing down of the possibility–to be it itself–to itself beyond the two-
fold of donner/donated and beyond a temporal measure (μέτρον) of before/after. As 
Derrida points out, Da-sein’s primordial thrownness lights up an alternative mode of 
“radical passivity” because the “being-thrown” is not yet submitted to the alternatives 
of “activity and passivity” (Derrida, 2008b, 21). We note in passing that Heidegger’s 
choice of the neuter word Dasein appears in accord with the middle voice and its 
destructuring function that it plays in the question of Being, and the neutrality of Da-
sein sign-als the alterities of the “radical passivity” and the “self-tradition.” 
In each specific case (je) of Da-sein translation, “I am” (Ich bin) appears to utter 
“by twos” in sharing a call (Ruf) of an unlocatable origin (genesis) of my there-being 
with an identifiable mouth of my (t) here-being. “I” speak unawarely with a non-co-
incidental voice which is quivering in a deferring-differing beat. Do we hear afar the 
Derridean movement of différance? In the absence of identifiable ground (Ab-grund) 
thereby without universal guidelines for ways of being, each Da-sein is called to trans-
port on its own terms one’s share of the non-coincidental voice and of possible ways 
to be (t)here differently from one another insofar as it remains there-being. “Mea res 
agitur”4 (Heidegger, 1992a, 8E).
Parenthetically, we would like to insert a few lines of clarification regarding the 
relation between authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) in 
4 “I am what is being enacted” or “I am that which concerns me.” These translations are provided by 
William McNeill who is the translator of Heidegger’s The Concept of Time (Heidegger, 1992a).
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Being and Time. Their relationship is a modified reversal on the basis of the primor-
dial givenness of life sent-and- relayed impersonally in the wake of transcendence. 
Da-sein’s everyday comportments of stupor (Benommenheit)5 and dispersion in cu-
riosity and realization of its concerns show Da-sein is dwelling nowhere and having 
no-mind of its own. Common discourse is the case at point. Everyday manner of 
“I-speak” truncates an “I’s” word-ing from an inarticulable other of its own voice and 
does not emerge as the “One of coming together passing away” (Scott, 1996, 210). 
This disintegration tears away contemporaneously not only an “I’s” but also word’s 
power of presentifying the given as it is. Both “I” and “word” in a simple act of saying 
lose the evocative power and access to the originary disclosure of the given that is 
sent carefreely and neutrally by way of the transcendence and the translation of Da-
sein to the unnoticeable stroke of disintegration, mechanistic repetition, by parroting, 
overhearing, and overusing, of the handed down truths and practices about human 
ways to be in the world, which exacerbates the exhaustion, dispersion, and decline 
(Courtine, 1993, 246). In our view, repetition (Wiederholung) is to call Da-sein’s mind 
and spirit back from the disorientation and to reawaken Da-sein to the past event of 
self-transcendence and to let Da-sein heed the enigmatic simultaneity of disappear-
ing-appearing as the necessary knot of the “and” that crosses over authentic histo-
ricity “and” authentic temporality. In-authenticity comes to pass and unfolds in and 
with authenticity which fully saturates, as the passing moments, everyday modes of 
dwelling, and extends itself along with inauthenticity; conversely, since in-authentic-
ity de-velops in, with, and out of authenticity and envelopes the given potency to be, 
there stands before any Da-sein always already a possibility of the retrieval (Wieder-
holung) of the potency and of letting one another’s life orient properly. A possibility 
remains outstanding for anyone to ignite a fire of care for the emergence of life and 
for belonging to the apriori past. Thus, we underline that the relation between au-
thenticity and inauthenticity is not couched in an antagonistic opposition. Neither the 
Verfallen nor the Schuldigsein connotes tones of moral fallenness and condemnation 
in Being and Time. Let’s return to the transcendence.
Heidegger names Da-sein as the mode of [our] being-“to-be-it-at-its-time” 
(Heidegger, 1985, 153). His designation of Da-sein interconnects thoroughly the way 
to be with the way to temporalize. We have mentioned that the German word erfahren 
indicates an experience of going all the way in and with the Sache. We have become 
aware of the inadequacies of thinking in terms of present-based time and its temporal 
5 The word Benommenheit Heidegger uses to designate Da-sein’s everyday comportment of absorp-
tion will be designated as a basic character of the non-human animal in a sense of alogon. 
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measure of before and after, language of substance and intentionality, and linearity of 
predicative grammar in order for us to become transparent with/in thrownness. How 
are we then to be our own time and how are we to own time? We shall now turn to 
Heidegger’s conception of the primordial temporality and the notion of self-tradition 
(Sichüberlieferung) and proceed to discern how Heidegger attempts to rejoin authen-
tic temporality and authentic historicity by avoiding a trap of the former to be the root 
upon which the latter rooted.
Some may misperceive Da-sein’s self-transcendence as if Da-sein is an autono-
mous self-moving being. Da-sein’s ek-sistence is always already moved (Bewegtheit) 
by the equiprimordial, not sequential, ecstases of time (Heidegger, 1996, 302, 321). 
As section 65 of Being and Time inscribes in the heading, temporality is the ontolog-
ical meaning of care (Sorge) (Heidegger, 1996, 350). And yet, temporality cannot be 
said to be a “what” because it is not a being: “The phenomenon of toward…, to…, 
together with… reveal temporality as the ekstatikon par excellence. Temporality is the 
primordial “outside of itself ” in and for itself. This we call the phenomena of future, 
having-been, and present, the ecstasies of temporality” (Heidegger, 1996, 302). Ac-
cordingly, the three ecstases give the sens of temporalization (Zeitigung) for Da-sein’s 
existential structures (understanding, disposition, discourse and fallenness): the fu-
ture as ahead-of-itself and anticipation for understanding, the having-been for dispo-
sition, and the present for discourse and falling. They give the direction of a “whereto” 
of path breaking, and chart a horizontal scheme and by their unitary release open 
something like a horizon (Heidegger, 1996, 333). 
Since each temporalization carries out enrapturing in and of itself, the future, 
the having-been, and the present have in themselves a wholeness (Heidegger, 1996, 
321). Each ecstasis does not derive from the other, and yet as a constitutive player 
of the unity of temporality, each ecstasis becomes de-distanced and mutually co-de-
pendent. Thus, the enrapt unity of temporality is not “a simple ‘primordial ground’” 
(Heidegger, 1996, 124). To make the matter further perplexing, he underscores that 
primordial time is the future, despite stating that the three ecstases appear to carry an 
equal weight and value in “‘the work’” (Zeitigung) of time (Zeit)” (Dastur, 1990, 67). 
This giving the future a primacy of time draws a decisive marker of transition in Being 
and Time. Heidegger states:
…Da-sein can come toward itself at all in its ownmost possibility and perdure the pos-
sibility as possibility in this letting-itself-come-toward-itself, that is, that it exists. Let-
ting-come-toward-itself that purdures the eminent possibility is the primordial phenom-
enon of the future. If authentic or inauthentic being-toward-death belongs to the being 
of Da-sein, this is possible only as futural…, the coming in which Da-sein comes toward 
HORIZON 10 (1) 2021 71
itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being. Anticipation makes Da-sein authentically fu-
tural in such a way that anticipation itself is possible only in that Da-sein, as existing, al-
ways already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general. …Only because 
Da-sein in general is as I am-having-been, can it come futurally toward itself in such a 
way that it comes-back. Authentically futural Da-sein is authentically having-been […]. 
In a way, having-been arises from future.” (Heidegger, 1996, 299)
Future is no longer a not-yet-actualized-now nor a past, bygone now. In and 
through the originary movement of unified rapture, “the present ‘arises’ from or is 
held by a future that has-been,” and Heidegger calls this unitary primordial phenom-
enon “temporality” (Heidegger, 1996, 300). In other words, ecstatic temporality is 
the apriori past of the present-oriented world-time and the ekstatikon of temporality 
pulses and animates at the heart of time. Primordial temporality is co-originary with 
world-time; the latter dissimulates the former (Derrida, 2016, 267). Rapturous matu-
ration of the three ec-stases opens the Da of Da-sein and of the world, which means 
both time and Da-sein are finite. “As historical, Da-sein is possible only on the basis 
of temporality. Temporality temporalizes itself in the ecstatic-horizonal unity of its 
raptures” (Heidegger, 1996, 362). Neither images of eternity and God nor narratives 
which are transcendent to the ekstatikon of temporality are there. Equiprimordial ec-
static temporality leads Heidegger to depart from the legacy of time passed on by 
St. Augustine (Confessions, Book XI), Kant’s I-think and the transcendental schema-
tism of imagination, Hegel’s absolute spirit, and Husserl’s living present. If a rapturous 
and carefree self-loss of temporality makes possible Da-sein’s ek-sistence, how can we 
mortals find the necessary nexus for a wholeness of life stretched between birth and 
death? 
Heidegger lets us find the hold by resolutely taking over the ownmost possibility 
of death and by affirming the ownmost facticity of originary thrownness. How? As we 
shall see, it involves a tautological retrieval of the equiprimordial (gleichursprünglish) 
temporality and a resolute turning that corresponds to the rapturous self-disclaiming 
movement of temporalization. In the tautological turning of re-moving the primor-
dial time and moving with it, authenticity takes place as becoming transparent to the 
being-thrown with no-ground of self-certainty and yet thrown with immeasurable 
possibilities and absolute freedom. There is no hold other than the ecstatic tempo-
rality that Da-sein has in a world to turn to for the discovery of a possible solution to 
how to own a wholeness of its fragmentary, finite life. The way of attaining authentic 
self-transparency (Heidegger, 1996, 299) shifts a route from understanding to disposi-
tion and takes a form of reticent attestation to Da-sein’s self-constancy (Selbst-ständig-
keit) of nullity or no-self ground which Heidegger calls “being-guilty” (Schuldigsein) 
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(Heidegger, 1996, 282). For we notice that the call of conscience, Angst, Vorlaufen of 
being-toward-death, and the moment of anticipatory resoluteness are configured in 
the middle voiced turning so as to turn around the axis of ensnarement (inauthentic-
ity) and enrapturement (authenticity) of there-being. 
We notice that ecstatic temporality enables Heidegger to interlace the coun-
ter-moments of living and dying, calling forth and calling back, or running ahead and 
running back in an imitation (mimesis) of the equiprimordial rapture of time. Call of 
conscience, anxiety, and the moment of resoluteness come to pass, all of sudden, out 
of nowhere and without a voice (Heidegger, 1996, 338) and hits Da-sein (Heidegger, 
1996, 186). The radical passivity of Da-sein pervades these experiences. There is no 
show of phenomenality in these crucial nexuses during which Da-sein receives back 
resolutely and takes over as “mine” the ownmost no-relational possibility of death 
and on the basis of the future Da-sein retrieves authentic possibility to be, that is, 
the being-thrown, and becomes authentic “what it already was inauthentic” (Das-
tur, 1990, 68). By intimating the opposite ends–birth and death– of non-belonging, 
Dasein stretches and is stretched (erstreckt sich selbst) in consonance with the raptur-
ous stretching (Sicherstrecken ) of primordial temporality and comes to stand whol-
ly in non-belonging (Schuldigsein) (Heidegger, 1996, 357–358).This movement of 
self-stretching is a middle-voiced re-moving with the sameness of primordial tempo-
rality. Da-sein comes back to own the selfsame thrown potency and “the power of its 
finite freedom” (Heidegger, 1996, 351). Da-sein comes to own its historicity.
Da-sein’s attaining authentic self-transparency on the basis of the future gives 
back possibilities of reformulation to the cultural heritage wherein Da-sein finds itself 
thrown and nurtured; thus, Da-sein’s retrieval takes over at once both Da-sein’s own 
chosen possibility and the possibility pre-given by the past others of a common cul-
tural memory and practice (Heidegger, 1996, 351). Since Da-sein is intrinsically Mit-
sein, Da-sein’s resolute attestation of “being-guilty” opens Da-sein’s responsiveness to 
the other in such a way that Da-sein frees one another from “what already was inau-
thentic.” In the moment (Augenblick) of insight, sending a gift of letting-be to the oth-
er in all spatio-temporal directions happens. Resolute Da-sein is enabled to respond to 
a deeper call of respect and solicitude for one another’s thrown finitude; such respon-
siveness is purely pre-sentiment e-merging spontaneously prior to personal identity 
and prior to the heritage of divine laws, civil laws, and human rights. Da-sein’s re-ori-
enting itself in the past of ek-sistence and belonging properly to non-belonging lets 
Da-sein enown (ereignen) its “most proper possibility (die eigenste Möglichkeit) of the 
impossibility” and transfigures every Da-sein into a mortal who assumes and attests 
the living (phenomenological) truth (alētheia) of non-appearance beyond the human 
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subject’s judgment, logics, and question (Heidegger, 1996, 242). Here, we see the trace 
of what Heidegger has named his phenomenology, namely as the “phenomenology of 
the inapparent”. The intimate relation between the possibility and the impossibility of 
death brings back also the rhythm of the lost middle voice to our ear, the “nontran-
sitive” step (“a-pas”) of which the “ –ance” of différance remembers (Derrida, 1972, 
9). In anticipation of death, every Jemeinigkeit is let to stand in neither the subjective 
nor objective position; no one is reduced to a situation of other than itself. Freely 
giving-and-taking of the possibility to be itself thereby freely sending to one another 
nothing other than a possibility of letting “be-it-at-its-time” means to give a gift of au-
thentic historicity. And yet, as we shall see shortly, Derrida loosens the knot of death, 
language, and Da-sein which bears a marker of the border between the mortal Da-sein 
and the living beings of non-Dasein and animals in Heidegger’s question of Being.
In the bare roots of transcendence, Da-sein assists the other’s historizing 
(Geschehen) and affirms one another’s singularity and difference by giving anyone 
equal shares of freedom and respect for the ability to be. Da-sein sends each other a 
gift of self-stretching (sich-erstreckung). At the same time, the responsive letting-be 
lets the world dawn with bottomless reserve of freedom, resistance, and possibilities 
for re-creation of the world as a common place of dwelling by mortals who are mind-
ful of the necessity of crossing over the Present as and from the past of the future, and 
thus we find the necessity of aligning our history of the Present with the inapparent 
non-historical dimension. The middle of the middle voice as well as that of the neu-
trality of Da-sein stretches to draw a space of inviolable freedom and of originary kin-
ship (Geschlecht) among the finite beings and surprisingly brings back a monumental 
importance to the heritage through a task of destructuring. 
And yet, as we have seen, Da-sein is not, in a final analysis, the carrier of the 
historical repetition (Erwidert) and transference of the intellectual and spiritual herit-
age to which it belongs with the other. Authentically, there is no eigen in the authentic 
historicity of Da-sein (Derrida, 2016, 164–165). For it is the unified rapture of the 
equi-primordial temporalization of the three ecstases that engenders without a telos, 
without a return, a fire of life to be possible and hands itself down itself from the future 
(á-venir) which is assumed as the past of the future by Da-sein’s transcendence to a 
historical horizon of the present. Heidegger names Sichüberlieferung this self-stretch-
ing disposition of time with simultaneity of loss and gain, termination and opening 
of life, that conditions the very possibility of a self-showing occurrence of life. Hei-
degger designates “fate” (Sichicksal) for the essential character of the self-tradition of 
which and upon which Da-sein’s authentic historicity and its anticipatory resoluteness 
and a history in general turn to recoil either in an tautological imitation of bearing 
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together with the other that comes to linger in one’s fold as lingering with the other 
in the unifying emergence or in a dissimulation without an enigmatic simultaneity of 
passing-arising in coming to presence of thing. Heidegger states:
Only a being that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be thrown back 
upon its factical There, free for its death and shattering itself on it, that is, only a being 
that, as futural, is equiprimordially having-been, can hand down to itself its inherit-
ed possibility, take over its own thrownness and be in the Moment for “its time.” Only 
authentic temporality that is at the same time finite makes something like fate, that is, 
authentic historicity, possible. (Heidegger, 1996, 352)
Although Heidegger is able to de-present and de-such the present oriented senses 
of life and the world in Being and Time, his privileging of human Da-sein in the ques-
tion of the meaning of being unveils a remnant of humanism. We have indicated that 
Da-sein’s ownness in the account of authentic historicity comes to be overturned and 
ends up deferred due to the notion of self-tradition. The text never intends to establish 
an ethics and yet on the bases of the middle-voiced conception of self-tradition, some-
thing like the “original ethics” of which Heidegger talks about in Letter on Humanism 
is already unterwegs, though in germination. For he wonders “if and how the being of 
animal is constituted by a time” (Heidegger, 1996, 317). Why not let our animal others 
be themselves at their time? How can we learn to think, to speak of, and to relate with 
proper sensibility to our animal others, not just as their speakers and/or using the label 
of asinanity (bêtise) to discriminate others of our human kind? Are we as torch bearers 
of the tradition called philosophy called to make a stretch of Heidegger’s different legein? 
If the life of non-human animals can be understood by neither categories which apply to 
Vorhandenheit nor to Da-sein, what then is their life and living really? They are not pure 
things at hand, not tool-like instruments, nor existence like Da-sein. How are we to let 
the unknown other speak on their terms and let them be? In a lineage of Heideggerian 
care, we should like to turn now to Derrida’s 2008 essay The Animal That Therefore I 
Am and see how Derrida carries forward the Heideggerian question of Being and of 
language beyond a limit of humanism. Let us witness a moment of historical repetition. 
In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida gives us his neologism “Animot.” 
By this word, Derrida invites us to a way of self-overcoming of the rational animal. So, 
what is “animot”? This word is made of two different French words, the plural of animal 
(animaux) and the word “mot” for word (Derrida, 2008a, x). When written, it evidently 
betrays that it is fabricated by a human animal (i.e., Jacques Derrida). When spoken, it 
has the plural animaux; when heard within the general singular, this word evokes unac-
countable diversity of animals which our long-standing usage of “the animal” has cov-
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ered over (Derrida, 2008a, x). Derrida seeks to displace the monolithic category of “the 
animal” (Derrida, 2008a, 23) and to help him and us become aware of a self-violence 
and disregard for the life of the other which we unaware are or not, committing whenev-
er we speak and write the word “animal.” He lets us redefine autobiography as “the trace 
of the living for itself, being for itself, the auto-affection as memory or archive of living” 
(Derrida, 2008a, 47). With an “animot, the “I” of the autos” loses its clear voice of ipseity 
and speaks of multiple voices of the living animal kinds. Here, we have a very different 
approach to the “I am” (Je suis) than that of Da-sein oriented in an “I am” of homo and 
in a Jeweilig-Jemeinigkeit in the quest-ion of authenticity and of self-overcoming of rep-
resentational thought, language, and sensitivity. 
“Ecce Animot,” says Derrida (Derrida, 2008a, 41). In the history of Western phi-
losophy, the singular limit between the human and the animal has been kept and circu-
lated in the realization of human ways to be in the world. As a philosopher, Derrida is 
keenly aware that no philosophers in the heritage have reflected on their presumption 
of humanity and their blind use of “the general singular that is the animal” and voiced 
against the violent way of gathering, homogenizing, and grouping-together of myriad 
lives of things (ta panta) in the world under the general singular name “animal.” Like 
the word pharmakon, the word “animal” has functioned to make flourish a body of 
communal and individual belonging by denying, weeding off, or repressing what we 
humans perceive most threatens living and by using the poisonous for auto-immunity. 
In this process of self-immunization for the sake of human life, we have forgotten what 
living is and who we and others really are. We humans are the event of history. If history 
essentially belongs to the future as Heidegger has discovered through the question of the 
meaning of being via Da-sein, we must meditate on the originary given of our animal 
others on the basis of the future. Do we who believe to be the authors of life story and 
the researchers and compilers of historiographies know the density of universal self-loss 
attached to the lightness of a word-pair of “humanity” and “animality”?
Derrida does not aim at a restoration of the relationship between the human 
and the animal by a simple reversal of the opposition by giving back to the animal the 
deprived qualities-speech, reason, experience of death, mourning, cuisine, clothing, 
lying, laughing, crying, pretense of pretense, respect, technics, institutions, culture, 
and so forth; a list could go on. According to Derrida, the canon of philosopher-au-
thors from “Aristotle to Heidegger, from Descartes to Kant, Levinas, and Lacan” (Der-
rida, 2008a, 27) has repeatedly denied these qualities to animal. But, those qualities 
and capacities are not so much a matter of metaphysical opposition than a question of 
difference. Thus, let me cite the nucleus of Derrida’s critical response (Erwidert): “It 
also means asking whether what calls itself human has the right rigorously to attribute 
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to man, which means therefore to attribute to himself, what he refuses the animal, and 
whether he can ever possess the pure, rigorous, indivisible concept, as such, of that 
attribution” (Derrida, 2008a, 135).
It is the presumption of humanity that obliterates our tracking and following of 
finite life with the other. To be able to say and write “Here is who I am” without anxiety, 
we philosophers are called to remember the impossible Heideggerian truth that no self, 
no life, no writing comes to take place before the world and without passing through the 
generous sending of the finite other and of time’s self-tradition in the coming of beings. 
In the resonance of the no-word of différance and in the exteriority of archi-writing in 
the heritage of Being and Time, all sorts of animals appear to speak of “animot” and 
stand out of the general category. Animot is a letter beyond humanism. In the resound-
ing of animot, all animals are let to come to a-rise from a future of memory.
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